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I. INTRODUCTION 
The advertising and promotion of a diverse array of medical 
products to consumers has been an established part of American 
culture for decades,1 particularly so for the advertising and 
promotion of prescription and over-the-counter drugs.  Efforts by 
federal agencies, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), to restrict this type of commercial speech invariably have 
 
 †    MD, JD, Professor of Law, Director of Health Law & Policy, Yonsei Law 
School, Seoul, Korea. 
 1.  See Scott H. Podolsky & Jeremy A. Greene, A Historical Perspective of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion and Physician Education, 300 JAMA 831, 831 (2008). 
1
Patsner: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Restricted, Surgically Implante
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1208 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
crashed on the rocks of the Hudson,2 almost without regard to how 
uninformative, misleading, or less than completely truthful such 
advertising to consumers has been.3  Efforts to rein in this practice 
have invariably been judged by federal courts to not be tailored 
narrowly enough to outweigh the purported but unproven benefits 
of such practices,4 or to justify chipping away at the constitutional 
pedestal of protection of commercial speech on which direct-to-
consumer advertising (DTCA) of medical products stands. 
Although purely false advertising does not enjoy First 
Amendment protection,5 almost anything above this low bar has 
been difficult to suppress, at least in the arena of food and drugs.  
In general, court decisions have usually determined that the 
alleged potential proclaimed benefits of DTCA—education of 
citizens, improvement of the physician-patient relationship, 
vigorous defense against efforts to limit freedom of expression6—
outweigh the alleged risks posed by limiting this type of 
commercial speech.  Of the three claimed benefits society enjoys 
from DTCA, the potential to educate health consumers (i.e., real 
people) is by far the most important.  Commercial speech enjoys 
much less protection, in general, than an individual’s freedom of 
speech, and the blizzard of negative press in the past decade about 
the relationship between academic medicine and the 
pharmaceutical industry7 would seem to make any claimed 
favorable effect of DTCA on the physician-patient relationship a 
stretch at best.  The same holds true for the relationship between 
medical device manufacturers and the surgeons or surgical 
 
 2.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
 3.  Id.  Although the Central Hudson standard for review of commercial 
speech protection is two-pronged, with the first test being whether the regulated 
speech is misleading or concerns an illegal activity (and if so, the speech receives 
no constitutional protection), Id. at 563–64, virtually any television advertisement 
for a prescription drug could be found to be misleading in the manner in which 
serious drug side effects are presented and in which any discussion of whether, on 
balance, such serious side effects outweigh the sometimes negligible benefits 
obtained from taking the drug product.  There are some apparent standards for 
what constitutes a fair and balanced pharmaceutical ad, but the same claim cannot 
be made for restricted implantable medical devices. 
 4.  Id. at 567–72. 
 5.  DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 154 (3d ed. 2010). 
 6.  Id. at 150–52.  
 7.  Podolsky & Greene, supra note 1, at 831; see also Wayne L. Pines, A History 
and Perspective of Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489 (1999). 
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specialty groups who use their products.8 
The bottom line is that it is really only the potential to educate 
consumers about the potential benefits (and risks) of medical 
devices that justifies efforts to protect such commercial speech 
from attempts by state and federal agencies to restrict (or even 
ban) it.  For this reason, the information contained in medical 
device advertisements and the information that should be 
contained in such ads to really educate a consumer, is one area in 
which this article will focus.  The focus here will also be exclusively 
on prescription, restricted, surgically implanted medical devices—
cardiac pacemakers, artificial knees and hips, coronary artery 
stents, biliary tract stents, and so forth.  The reasons are 
straightforward.  These medical devices are the most likely to have 
undergone some sort of clinical testing; are among the most 
expensive (and potentially lucrative) on the market; are the most 
likely to be advertised to consumers by medical centers and 
surgeons or surgical groups seeking patient referrals and a 
marketing advantage; are usually the most dangerous; and, lastly, 
are those devices in which the morbidity of the device is a function 
not only of the inherent properties of the device itself but also the 
skill of the surgeon and the facility in which the device is implanted 
in the patient.  Although technically not permanently implanted in 
patients, nor restricted in the sense that they reached the market 
via a premarket approval (PMA), robotic surgical systems such as 
the da Vinci are complex surgical devices that are temporarily 
inserted into patients and are prescription devices; that is, they can 
only be used under the direct supervision of an operating surgeon.  
These devices will be mentioned as well in this article, as there is 
literature on the accuracy of DTCA claims for this product. 
The importance of the medical device industry, and of the 
advertising of devices, cannot be overstated.  The topic of DTCA of 
medical devices in general, and restricted, surgically implanted 
devices in particular, deserves a closer look.  There are several good 
reasons for this. 
First, the medical device industry in the United States has 
grown, and continues to grow, almost exponentially over the last 
 
 8.  Senate investigators say Medtronic helped write medical journal articles 
promoting bone graft.  Michelle Fay Cortez & Drew Armstrong, Medtronic 
Manipulated Bone Product Data, Senate Panel Says, WASH. POST, Oct.                                   
25, 2012, http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-MCFN7M0UQVI901  
-3A6GLRR45DE8GQBSDJ5GNEFQ1C. 
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two decades and now is at the tip of the spear of the medical 
technology juggernaut in the United States.  Despite this, the 
enabling statute that effectively defined and regulates the medical 
device industry—the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the 1938 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—has remained largely 
unchanged in the basic manner in which medical devices are 
classified and the mechanisms by which they may reach United 
States consumers.  Second, the wide diversity of new medical 
devices and the engineering complexity of medical devices 
(including restricted, surgically implanted medical devices) is a 
quantum leap over previous generations.  Despite this, some 
innovative and potentially dangerous medical devices still reach 
United States markets via the abbreviated 510(k) clearance 
mechanism.  This mechanism requires no independent testing for 
either safety or effectiveness and allows many new medical devices 
to reach consumers merely by the sponsor briefly claiming that its 
new device is substantially equivalent to an already-marketed 
predicate medical device, which may be many generations afield 
from the new device and may no longer be either the gold standard 
or remotely relevant in terms of potential morbidity to the new 
device.  Third, as with prescription drugs there is a substantial 
amount of off-label use of restricted, surgically implanted medical 
devices; by virtue of coming under the practice of medicine, this 
activity remains outside the FDA’s direct regulatory control.  And as 
with off-label use of prescription drugs, this activity for medical 
devices shows no sign of slowing down.  Lastly, as the medical 
device industry has expanded, DTCA and promotion of certain 
medical devices has begun to emerge. 
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR MEDICAL DEVICE 
CLASSIFICATION AND REGULATION OF ADVERTISING 
The FDA assumed direct regulatory authority over medical 
devices as a result of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments9 to the 
1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.10  Medical devices are 
classified into one of three classes (I, II, and III) based on safety 
risk, with class III devices being the most dangerous.11  Medical 
 
 9.  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 10.  Federal Food, Drug, and  Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)). 
 11.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). 
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devices can either be marketed directly (e.g., a new kind of tongue 
depressor) without any direct FDA involvement; be cleared for 
marketing via a 510(k) mechanism, which allows a new medical 
device to be sold if it is found to be substantially equivalent to an 
existing medical device already on the market; or approved 
following submission of a PMA,12 which unlike the 510(k) clearance 
actually requires substantial, new clinical trial data on safety and 
efficacy.  There are labeling requirements for both 510(k)- and 
PMA-approved device marketing, but the requirements for the 
latter are more stringent. 
Another layer in the FDA medical device regulatory 
mechanism is the concept of the restricted, as well as the 
prescription, medical device.  Most non–class I medical devices are 
prescription medical devices, which are approved either via 510(k) 
clearance or PMA and which are defined as devices that the FDA 
deems safe only if used under the supervision of a licensed medical 
practitioner.13  Prescription medical devices are subject to FDA 
labeling requirements that, among other things, require labeling 
that includes adequate information for use associated with the 
device in order for the device to not be considered misbranded.14  
Because labeling encompasses brochures and promotional 
materials sent to physicians and consumers, in addition to the 
medical device label itself,15 this means that medical device 
manufacturers are liable for the absence of such information in 
DTCA of their devices.  The statute does not apply to physicians, 
surgical groups, hospitals, or academic medical centers when they 
are doing the promotion for the device as part of marketing 
activities since FDA regulations are intended only for industry, and 
promotional practices are an aspect of medical practice regulated 
by individual state medical boards.16 
Restricted medical devices are a subset of prescription medical 
devices.  A restricted device is subject to general prescription 
medical device labeling requirements but is also subject to 
 
 12.  Id. § 360e. 
 13.  21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 352(f). 
 14.  21 U.S.C. § 352(r)(2); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ALTERNATIVE TO CERTAIN                          
PRESCRIPTION DEVICE LABELING REQUIREMENTS (2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance 
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm072748.pdf. 
 15.  Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948). 
 16.  Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 396. 
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additional requirements on sale, use, distribution, or advertising.  
These additional restrictions may be imposed by the PMA, which 
authorizes the sale of the device, or by a separate regulation17 that 
recognizes that the device has a particular potential for harm or the 
device is so complicated to use that special measures are necessary 
to ensure that it is used properly and safely.  These are the only two 
ways prescription devices are also considered restricted medical 
devices. 
Some, but not all, surgically implanted restricted medical 
devices have reached consumers via PMAs.  Innovative, new, 
groundbreaking surgically implanted medical devices for which 
there is no predicate device—an already existing, marketed device 
to which the new device must be determined to be substantially 
equivalent—must do so via this route exclusively.  In the past, some 
surgically implanted medical devices have reached the market via 
the 510(k) clearance mechanism.  Since these devices are 
prescription devices but not restricted devices (because they were 
not approved via a PMA nor specified as restricted by specific 
regulation), this creates a problem whenever these devices are 
advertised and promoted by the manufacturer.  The reason for this 
is straightforward: the FDA has specific authority (by statute) to 
regulate advertising of restricted medical devices but does not have 
general statutory authority to regulate all other medical device 
advertising.18  This means that some surgically implanted device 
advertising cannot be regulated by the FDA if the device is not a 
restricted one.  This could be the case for a complex, surgically 
implanted class III device that reached the market via 510(k) 
clearance because there was a predicate device on the market to 
which it was substantially equivalent, even if the two devices are so 
dissimilar that, under ideal circumstances, de novo clinical trials 
demonstrating efficacy and safety should be required.  Although 
there are supposed to be calls by the FDA for submission of PMAs 
for such devices to correct this lag,19 the problem persists. 
For those surgically implanted class III medical devices that 
have reached consumers via PMA and that have been appropriately 
 
 17.  Id. §§ 352(e), 360j(f).  Only a handful of medical devices have been 
specifically designated as restricted by separate regulation.  One example is ASRs, 
specific reagents used for complex testing in certain laboratories.  Another 
example is hearing aids.  Restricted medical devices almost always are designated 
as such in the PMA. 
 18.  Id. § 352(q)–(r). 
 19.  See id. § 360e(a)(1), (i). 
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classified as restricted, the FDA has the statutory authority to 
regulate the advertising and promotion of such devices to 
consumers.  In general, the advertising of such devices cannot be 
“false or misleading in any particular.”20  For this reason, the 
general guidelines for medical devices mirror, though not exactly, 
those for prescription drugs. 
Advertisements for medical devices, for which the FDA does 
have statutory authority to regulate the promotion of, must also do 
two things: (1) state the established name of the medical device; 
and (2) contain “a brief statement of the intended uses of the 
device and relevant warnings” and precautions regarding safety—
side effects of the device, precautions when using the device, and 
contraindications for employing the device.21  These are minimum 
requirements; under the terms of the PMA, additional specific 
advertising restrictions or requirements may be imposed on the 
manufacturer.22 
The brief-statement requirement of the restricted medical 
device advertising requirement has undergone some adjustment by 
the FDA.  The FDA issued draft guidance in 2004 to help medical 
device manufacturers who advertise their restricted medical devices 
directly to consumers.23  It contained recommendations for content 
that closely mimics prescription DTCA requirements governing 
broadcast media such as television, radio, and telephone-based 
advertising.24  DTCA would comply with the FDA’s guidance if it: 
disclose[d] the most serious and most common risks 
associated with the device in either the audio or audio 
and visual parts of the presentation, and [made] adequate 
provision for dissemination of the approved package 
labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation 
(e.g., reprinting the labeling in magazine advertisements 
 
 20.  Id. § 352(q)(1). 
 21.  Id. § 352(r) (emphasis added). 
 22.  Id. § 360e(d)(B)(ii). 
 23.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISING OF 
RESTRICTED DEVICES (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr 
/04d-0042-gdl0003.pdf.  Although this draft guidance document has been 
withdrawn for administrative reasons, the underlying statutory provisions remain 
unchanged and so the steps discussed in the document are still relevant to 
industry for purposes of complying with the statutory requirements. 
 24. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 
(1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/backgrd/3627b2bl 
.pdf (covering advertising of prescription drugs). 
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and/or providing an 800 number that viewers can call to 
request that it be read or mailed to them).25 
How well does this regulatory scheme play out in the real 
world?  To answer this question, some data should be reviewed and 
commentary should be made about what the world of DTCA of 
restricted, surgically implanted medical devices looks like in the 
United States in 2012. 
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RESTRICTED, SURGICALLY IMPLANTED 
MEDICAL DEVICES DTCA: HOW MUCH IS OUT THERE, WHO IS DOING 
THE ADVERTISING, AND WHERE DOES THE ADVERTISING APPEAR? 
At the time of this writing, there were no substantive data 
published in either medical literature or law journals on the 
prevalence and characteristics of the relatively new phenomenon of 
DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted medical devices.  The 
topic of DTCA of medical devices, whether restricted, implantable, 
or otherwise, has without question been a below-the-radar-screen 
issue when compared to the decades-old controversy over DTCA of 
prescription pharmaceuticals.  For example, the definitive 
casebook on food and drug law26 devotes less than a paragraph to 
promotion of devices, whereas DTCA of prescription drugs merits 
more than fifty pages of text and commentary.  The text, Medical 
Device Regulation & Compliance, edited by Terman and O’Flaherty, 
provides a definition of advertising and labeling and, later in the 
text, provides an accurate and concise summary of the statutory 
requirements that must be met by such advertising but otherwise 
does not discuss the topic in any depth.27 
This author’s preliminary observations28 in 2009 represented 
the first attempt to begin to define some of the legal issues 
surrounding this area of food and drug law.  That publication 
explored some of the unique aspects of the involvement of the 
 
 25.  Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Labeling and Advertising of Medical Devices, in 
PROMOTION OF BIOMEDICAL PRODUCTS: REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 1, 14 (Thomas 
E. Colonna & Jeffrey K. Shapiro eds., 2006). 
 26.  See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD 
AND DRUG LAW (3d ed. 2008). 
 27.  Evan P. Phelps, Medical Device Labeling and Advertising, in MEDICAL DEVICE 
REGULATION & COMPLIANCE 23, 24, 32 (Stephen D. Terman & Neil F. O’Flaherty 
eds., 2010).  
 28.  Bruce Patsner, Problems Associated with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
(DTCA) of Restricted, Implantable Medical Devices: Should the Current Regulatory 
Approach be Changed?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 (2009). 
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medical profession (physicians, surgical groups, hospitals) in 
advertising for high-technology, surgically implanted medical 
devices on behalf of industry; discussed some of the problems with 
the information gap consumers face in interpreting the 
information (if any) contained in an advertisement for a restricted, 
surgically implanted medical device;29 and, lastly, commented at 
great length on current FDA guidelines and issues facing the FDA 
in regulating DTCA of devices.  Aside from one sentence about 
state regulatory actions against physicians (and, by implication, 
hospitals and medical centers) who fraudulently promote the 
unproven efficacy and safety benefits of some devices, much of the 
focus was on potential First Amendment issues. 
All well and good, but the relative scarcity of writing on DTCA 
of devices raises two other important issues, which have also not 
been addressed.  The first is the paucity of information about the 
prevalence of DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted medical 
devices: How much advertising is an average consumer exposed to?  
Who is doing the advertising, and where is the advertising 
(television, radio, magazines, billboards) being done?  In 
addressing this first question, it is important to keep in mind that 
we are talking about the promotion of medical devices to 
consumers, not to physicians. 
The second question derives from the first question: If the 
advertising itself and the entity doing the advertising for restricted, 
surgically implanted medical devices differ significantly from the 
DTCA of prescription drugs, then whose regulatory problem is it, 
the FDA’s or the states’?  In other words, if most or all of the 
promoting is done not by the medical device industry itself, but 
rather by surrogates such as physicians, surgical groups, hospitals, 
and academic medical centers, then the FDA should not be held 
accountable for failing to police the promotion.  And, if this is the 
case, then prevention of consumer fraud, not protection of the 
First Amendment rights of corporations against government 
encroachment, is where the battle line should be drawn. 
A. Prevalence and Publications 
During a three-month period of time when the author was 
consulting, traveling cross-country, living in three major 
metropolitan areas (New York, Houston, and Denver), and 
 
 29.  Id. at 38. 
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researching and drafting this manuscript, a determined effort was 
made to look for any advertising for restricted, surgically implanted 
medical devices in the United States in order to get a sense of how 
much advertising of such devices an average adult might be 
exposed to, and how it compared to DTCA of prescription drugs.30  
Particular attention was paid to who was doing the advertising 
(surgeon or surgical group, hospital, medical center) and what 
medium such advertising appeared in.  Travel during the summer 
of 2012 included airline flights (three flights from New Jersey to 
California, three flights from Texas to Colorado, three flights from 
New Jersey to Texas, and one flight from New York to Florida) and 
three cross-country drives (Colorado to Texas, Texas to Boston, 
and New Jersey to Colorado).  With the exception of the Pacific 
Northwest, every area of the United States was visited.  When not 
traveling, the author watched a minimum of six hours of non-cable 
television a day and listened to two hours of afternoon radio five 
days a week.31  Air travel involved a steady exposure to in-flight and 
airport magazines; interstate auto travel involved exposure to 
billboards.  The Internet was specifically excluded from this 
observation set.  No DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted 
medical devices was observed in any national newspapers, though 
the only paper read on a daily basis was The New York Times. 
Although no effort was made to perform a definitive 
quantitative, statistical analysis of the differences among advertising 
for different medical products, three observations about DTCA of 
these select restricted medical devices could easily, and definitively, 
be made.  Based on these observations, there are clearly some very 
unique aspects of the manner in which medical devices, 
particularly surgical and surgically implanted devices, are promoted 
to consumers when compared to the manner in which prescription 
drugs are advertised. 
First, the amount of DTCA of medical devices one is exposed 
to on a daily basis is much, much lower than the amount one is 
exposed to of advertising to consumers for prescription drugs.  
During the ninety days of observation, fewer than three dozen 
 
 30.  The number of advertisements in the United States for over-the-counter 
preparations involving the gastrointestinal tract and its manifestations—flatulence, 
diarrhea, constipation, hemorrhoids, and acid reflux—one is exposed to in three 
months simply defies mathematics. 
 31.  The author does not recommend this level of exposure to advertising or 
television as part of a healthy lifestyle. 
10
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different medical device ads were seen compared to literally 
hundreds of drug ads seen each week.  Average citizens are 
exposed to prescription drug promotions on a daily and constant 
basis whether one watches television, listens to radio, or reads 
magazines.  Second, during three months of looking, the author 
was able to find only one DTCA for a restricted, surgically 
implanted medical device by the manufacturer itself;32 all other 
advertisements were by individual surgeons, subspecialty surgical 
groups, hospitals, or large medical centers.33  This finding was not 
surprising.  The notion of industry advertising by medical 
professional surrogates was emphasized in legal writings on DTCA 
of medical devices,34 and it represents one of the major differences 
(other than sheer volume of advertising) between DTCA of 
prescription drugs and devices. 
Third, and just as important as the phenomenon of surrogate 
advertising, is the medium in which DTCA of restricted, 
implantable medical devices takes place.  Unlike advertising for 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs, which has an 
overwhelming presence on television,35 DTCA of restricted, 
 
 32.  This was an advertisement for an artificial knee by Stryker Corporation.  
The advertisement consisted of a group of elderly men attempting to bowl with 
oval bowling balls.  The point of the advertisement was ostensibly to point out that 
since the human knee is round (not oval) the artificial knee you have implanted 
should be round as well.  This advertisement contained no other vital information 
(efficacy, safety, or a picture of the actual artificial knee device itself) and assumed 
that (1) the human knee joint is round and (2) an average non-medical person 
would know this.  Although an average person might know that the kneecap is 
round, it is not clear how the concept of round actually matches up to a joint that 
is a hinge.  A similar ad is available online.  See Stryker Corp., GetAroundKnee 
Bowling TV Commercial, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=anrTJMwED5I. 
 33.  The particular surgeons, surgical groups, hospitals, or academic medical 
centers are somewhat region-specific when one looks at billboard advertising and 
radio advertising, although it is not rare to find advertisements for nationally 
prominent medical centers (such as MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston) 
and their technologies on billboards in neighboring states such as Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana from which they draw out-of-state patients.  In-flight 
airline magazines, such as Southwest Airlines, carry advertisements for local 
surgical groups (depending on the route) as well as larger specialty groups and 
hospitals, which are attempting to expand their referral group nationally. 
 34.  See Patsner, supra note 28, at 19. 
 35.  There is a large amount of DTCA of prescription and over-the-counter 
drugs as well as dietary supplements in consumer magazines, though the drugs 
advertised depend on the magazines (e.g., birth control pills and hormone 
replacement therapy in women’s magazines and erectile dysfunction drugs and 
supplements in magazines which men are more likely to read). 
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surgically implanted medical devices is a very rare occurrence on 
television.  In the three-month period of observation of surgically 
implanted medical device advertisements, only one of the 
promotions took place on television; this was the solitary 
advertisement by the manufacturer itself.  It is entirely possible to 
never see or hear DTCA for medical devices (particularly restricted, 
surgically implanted medical devices) on television or radio for 
months at a stretch. 
However, if one travels on major interstate highways, 
particularly near large urban areas or near academic medical 
centers, one can see billboards for hospitals or academic medical 
centers advertising their cutting-edge medical technologies (e.g., 
gamma-knife radiation therapy units, robotic surgical systems, 
spinal implants).  Billboard advertisements by the manufacturer of 
radiation therapy machines may also be observed in prominent 
places near passenger drop-off points at major airports, though 
these billboards are not for surgically implanted devices and 
provide no useful information other than the name of the 
company and a picture of the machine.36  By contrast, highway 
billboard advertisements for prescription drugs are rarely seen.  
The one common area in which both prescription drugs ads and 
ads for restricted, surgically implanted medical devices are seen37 
seems to be in magazines, airline magazines in particular. 
In summary, advertisements for restricted, surgically implanted 
medical devices are rarely television ads, are almost always by a 
member or institution of the medical profession that markets the 
device to prospective patients, and occur much, much less 
commonly than ads for prescription drugs.  The ads themselves—
the type of ad, the content of the ad, and the accuracy of the ad—
as well as the FDA statutory requirements for content of a DTCA, 
will now be examined. 
 
 36.  For example, the author has observed and advertisement at the Logan 
International Airport (Bos.) by Variant for their radiation therapy products. 
 37.  For example, the August 2012 issue of Spirit (Southwest Airlines’ in-flight 
magazine) contained no ads for prescription drugs, but it had medical device ads 
for Saint Thomas Hospital (Nashville, TN) and the Unity System for brain surgery 
(manufacturer not specified) as well as the infuriating spread of “the best Lasik 
Surgeons in America” with the disclaimer in small print at the top, “These doctors 
are among . . . .”  Advertising for surgeons, and advertising for medical devices, go 
hand in hand.  Advertisement, The Best Lasik Surgeons in America, SPIRIT, Aug. 2012, 
at 123. 
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B. Content and Accuracy of Information 
The content of the observed medical device advertisements to 
consumers appears to be diametrically opposed to that seen for 
prescription drug promotions.  Perhaps because of who is doing 
the advertising—a surgical group, hospital, or academic medical 
center—the content of the advertisement is invariably limited to 
the name of the medical device product, often accompanied by 
either a picture of the device itself, a physician/surgeon who is 
presumably involved in using or inserting the device, or both, as 
well as the affiliate institution or medical group where they are 
based.  The name of the manufacturer may or may not be 
prominently placed, and the indications (i.e., specific medical or 
surgical conditions for which patients might be able to judge if they 
are a suitable candidate) usually are absent.  Most importantly, 
there is a universal absence of any information related to safety or 
risk. 
In three months of constant travel and observation of (the few 
visible) restricted, surgically implanted medical device DTCA in the 
United States, the author did not see a single promotion that 
complied with the recommendations the FDA issued in its 2004 
guidance document.38  The only televised DTCA by the 
manufacturer of the medical device itself, which was observed 
during the entire ninety-day observation period by the author, was 
a New York City area prime-time advertisement by Stryker for its 
implantable artificial knee medical device.  The advertisement 
comprised a group of elderly men at a bowling alley attempting to 
knock down pins with an oval, instead of a round, bowling bowl.  
The ostensible purpose of the ad was that the Stryker artificial knee 
was better than alternatives (not mentioned) because it was round 
instead of oblong, just like the knee.  The ad failed to mention 
indications for use of the device, contraindications to use of the 
device, risks associated with insertion of the medical device, how 
long the device would last.  The ad also did not contain an advisory 
warning (to talk to your physician/surgeon), contact information 
for the company, or a website to visit.39 
By contrast, a routine printed or televised prescription drug 
advertisement contains enormous amounts of printed or broadcast 
 
 38.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra 
note 23. 
 39.  Stryker Corp., supra note 32. 
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safety information as well as the indications for the drug.  The drug 
advertisements always have a 1-800 number to dial for more 
information about the drug, a website to go to in order to obtain 
safety and efficacy information about the drug, as well as the 
labeled indication for use of the drug, and a statement to contact 
your physician to discuss questions about whether the drug is right 
for you.40  The absurdity of the medical device ad as either 
educational or informative, in addition to its gross failure to comply 
with regulatory requirements, is only exacerbated by the fact that 
the knee is a hinge joint and that the only structure in the knee 
that is ovoid (the knee cap or patella) is neither perfectly round 
nor oval (it’s almost square) and has no equivalent structure in an 
artificial knee at all.  This further assumes the average consumer 
would know something about the structure and function of the 
normal knee, or would have to mistakenly believe that the knee is 
round. 
C. What Does the Limited Data Show? 
There is no published data at the time of this writing on how 
accurate DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted medical devices 
is.  There is some published data on the accuracy of DTCA of 
robotic surgical systems—complicated medical devices, which, 
though not restricted devices, are complex prescription devices 
that are temporarily inserted into the body during minimally 
invasive surgical procedures.  The ability of hospitals and 
surgeons/surgical groups to offer advanced laparoscopic surgical 
services is a cornerstone of marketing advanced surgical programs 
in surgical oncology, gynecology, urology, and other medical 
specialties and, along with interventional cardiology services 
(coronary artery stents, minimally invasive aneurysm, and heart 
valve repairs) are among the most profitable items for hospitals, 
academic medical centers, and surgical specialty groups. 
 
 40.  There are specific content requirements for DTCA of prescription drugs 
in broadcast media as well as the basic requirements for promotional labeling and 
prescription drug advertising contained in 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d).  See also How 
Can an Ad Violate the Law?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs 
/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/UCM076768.htm 
#law_violation_how (last updated Sept. 13, 2012).  Though one might disagree 
with the degree to which pharmaceutical manufacturers strictly adhere to such 
guidelines and with the notion of whether DTCA should be allowed at all, there is 
little controversy at present with efforts of prescription drug manufacturers to 
provide safety risk information in their advertisements to consumers. 
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Many of the specialty surgical services noted use the da Vinci 
robotic surgical system developed by Intuitive Surgical, Inc.41  
DTCA by surgeons and hospitals has been an ongoing activity for 
more than half a decade.  At this point, some data has accumulated 
on how this particular prescription medical device is promoted to 
consumers in the field of women’s cancer services, the surgical 
specialty that has the longest and most expansive experience with 
use of the medical device.  The little data available is not 
encouraging.  Because of current trends in marketing to 
consumers, all of the investigations have focused on internet-based 
promotions, such as hospital websites. 
In a paper42 presented at the March 2012 annual meeting of 
the Society of Gynecologic Oncology—the oldest and most 
prestigious international organization in the world devoted 
exclusively to gynecologic cancer—investigators from Columbia 
University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City, 
and Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina 
analyzed the content, quality, and accuracy of information 
provided on hospital websites about robotic gynecologic surgery.  
The study was a systematic analysis of randomly chosen hospitals 
with more than 200 beds; the chosen hospitals evaluated were 
predominately in (moving from east to west) New York, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, Colorado, and California.43  The 
authors analyzed the promotions of a robotic surgical system 
medical device for information on clinical claims of effectiveness, 
assertions of institutional superiority, ease of access to information 
about the medical device, and use of emotionally driven 
marketing.44  More than half of the advertising was for cancer-
related conditions, and between one-half and two-thirds of the 
promotions used either stock photographs or stock narratives from 
the manufacturer.45  One-third of the websites specifically 
mentioned the name of the company in promotions for da Vinci 
 
 41.  See generally INTUITIVE SURGICAL, http://www.intuitivesurgical.com (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 42.  Maria B. Schiavone et al., The Commercialization of Robotic Surgery: 
Unsubstantiated Marketing of Gynecologic Surgery by Hospitals, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 174.e1 (2012). 
 43.  Id. at 174.e1–.e2. 
 44.  Id. at 174.e2–.e3.  The analysis in the paper was based on descriptive 
statistics.  Id. at 174.e2. 
 45.  Id. at 174.e2–.e3. 
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hysterectomy for benign surgical conditions.46  Over 6% of 
promotions for gynecologic-cancer surgery specifically mentioned 
“improved cancer outcomes” despite a paucity of published data 
that demonstrates that patients who undergo robotic surgery, as 
opposed to more conventional surgery, actually have higher cure 
rates for their malignancy.47 
Superiority claims were supported by evidence-based data in 
fewer than 15% of advertisements.48  Cost (3.7% of promotions), 
complications (1.6% of claims), and operating time compared to 
conventional surgery (3.7% of advertisements) were rarely, if ever, 
discussed.49  The conclusions of the authors in this first-of-its-kind 
marketing analysis were that “[m]arketing of robotic gynecologic 
surgery [by hospitals] is widespread.  Much of the content [of this 
marketing] is not based on high-quality data, fails to present 
alternative procedures, and relies on stock text and images” from 
the manufacturer of surgical robots.50  Potential limitations and 
costs are rarely presented to patients.51  The low incidence of 
medical-device-related, complication-rate reporting and the virtual 
total absence of medical-device-related safety information strongly 
suggests that there is no realistic attempt for such DTCA to comply 
with the FDA statutory requirements. 
Recent expert commentary52 by prominent academicians in 
obstetrics and gynecology has also pointed out that hospital 
promotions for robotic surgery on billboards and the Internet 
provide misleading information to patients and consumers.  Much 
of the content of the promotions is provided by the manufacturers, 
does not provide accurate evidence-based information, and 
provides either false information about benefits and complications 
or ignores the risks and costs altogether.  As things currently stand, 
manufacturers of devices do have to comply with statutory 
requirements for balance of information and content, but rarely 
have to do so since they rarely advertise; the medical groups need 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 174.e3 (finding 6.3% of promotions described improved cancer 
outcomes and 9.4% of promotions described higher lymph node yields). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 174.e1. 
 51.  Id. at 174.e3. 
 52.  See, e.g., Andrew M. Kaunitz, The Promotion of Robotic Gynecologic Surgery by 
Hospitals: Are Our Patients Being Misled?, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 12, 2012), http:// 
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/772325. 
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not comply with statutory requirements for information and rarely 
bother to, even though they do almost all of the advertising. 
IV. THE OTHER CORE ISSUE: INFORMATION AND EDUCATION 
The focus in this article thus far has been on the structure of 
DTCA for prescription, restricted, surgically implanted medical 
devices in the United States.  As has been shown, the amount of 
DTCA and the source of the advertising differ for medical devices 
and for prescription drugs.  Even though the FDA statutory 
requirements are similar for broadcast and magazine promotions 
for drugs and devices, the former generally comply, while the latter 
do not. 
All of this raises an interesting, though largely hypothetical, 
opportunity to analyze some of the restriction of commercial 
speech issues, which have plagued both the FDA and the 
pharmaceutical industry over the past twenty years, as they might 
apply to the medical devices industry.  What if the medical device 
industry was to make a determined effort to actively do the majority 
of the DTCA of its products on its own without using hospitals and 
surgical groups as surrogates?  What information should be 
contained in the ads in order to comply with the FDA regulations 
and recommendations regarding effectiveness and risks for the 
products?  Would simply meeting the same requirements 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have to meet in broadcast 
advertisements (e.g., a 1-800 number, balanced presentation of 
risks and benefits with significant, safety issues emphasized, etc.) be 
adequate, or are there limitations on the availability of critical 
information that the medical-device industry cannot control that 
might prevent the manufacturers from ever being able to provide 
information about safety sufficiently educational for consumers?  
And if the ads cannot ever be adequately educational, do the 
promotions deserve the same level of commercial-speech 
protection as the promotions for prescription drugs by commercial-
drug manufacturers?  I will briefly address these issues prior to 
summing up my conclusions. 
A comprehensive review of all of the information defects 
inherent in any attempt to provide information necessary to meet 
statutory requirements for a fair and balanced presentation of all of 
the relevant efficacy and safety issues for a complex, restricted, 
surgically implanted medical device is beyond the scope of this 
article.  The following discussion may be viewed as both a summary 
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of the information that should appear and an explanation of why 
such information cannot appear (i.e., it is not available).53 
Consumers are generally unaware of the indications and 
characteristics of medical devices until they become patients.  
Unlike the packaging for prescription pharmaceuticals, there is no 
patient package insert54 for restricted, surgically implanted medical 
devices for patients to read so that they may become familiar with 
the indications for the devices as well as the major safety risks and 
complications for the devices themselves.  Most of these devices are 
employed by the physicians to whom patients are referred, so 
providing a statement in an advertisement that one should contact 
his or her physician is less meaningful in the context of a restricted, 
surgically implanted medical device.  The primary care physician 
from whom the patient gets the referral is virtually never a surgeon 
and, unlike the situation with routine prescribing of prescription 
drugs, is unlikely to be familiar with the mechanics and problems 
with the device.  General practice physicians are unlikely to know 
enough about complicated medical devices to be able to 
meaningfully counsel patients. 
Physicians in medical school have extensive and mandatory 
exposure to pharmacology and pharmaceuticals from the first two 
years of medical school on, but no standardized instruction or 
exposure to complex medical devices until they do surgical 
rotations.  Physicians, as a rule, know less about devices than they 
do about pharmaceuticals, just as consumers do.  Surgeons (and 
consumers) themselves have no equivalent to the Physician Desk 
Reference for prescription drugs for prescription medical devices; 
there is no readily available source of information or compendium 
of medical device labels that may be consulted by patients prior to 
having such a device inserted into their body.  Patients would need 
to be very familiar with the standard medical, non-surgical 
treatments of their medical conditions in order to know if and 
when they are appropriate candidates for surgically implanted 
medical devices. 
There is no evidence that either consumers or physicians are 
aware of the contours of the medical device approval process at the 
FDA in general, or of the fact that some surgically implanted 
 
 53.  Some of this material has been described in greater detail in the one 
existing law review article on the subject of DTCA of restricted Class III medical 
devices.  See Patsner, supra note 28. 
 54.  21 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2012). 
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devices can be marketed in the United States without undergoing 
extensive testing for safety and effectiveness.  Nor is long-term 
safety and efficacy data (e.g., how long will the newest type of hip 
implant last?) a routine part of the medical device marketing 
approval process, even if the device has a PMA—comparative 
effectiveness data is sorely lacking.  Another complicating factor is 
that the approvals for drugs at the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research and biologicals at the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research are at least almost always made by physicians, whereas at 
the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the ultimate 
decision for devices is frequently made by non-medical personnel, 
such as engineers, who neither understand clinical medicine nor 
are trained to balance clinical medical efficacy versus patient 
medical safety. 
Even if these defects—labeling; the medical device approval 
process; physician training and exposure to complex medical 
devices; the FDA’s numerous problems with the way it approves or 
clears medical devices for marketing in the United States; and the 
virtual lack of long-term safety and device failure rate for restricted, 
surgically implanted medical devices—could all be corrected, there 
is still the problem of the lack of information on surgical and 
hospital experience, performance, and complication rates.  There 
is a profound lack of reliable, useful information on surgical 
outcomes using devices for individual surgeons, surgical groups, 
hospitals, surgical centers, and academic medical centers, which 
can allow consumers to determine the comparative skill and safety 
for restricted, implantable medical devices.  This is an inherent 
defect for both physicians and consumers, and unique for devices 
compared to drugs.  In the absence of such information, fair 
balance and meaningful content requirements for a restricted, 
surgically implanted medical device for DTCA cannot be met. 
Even this short list and discussion illustrates that there are 
significant obstacles to providing the requisite relevant safety and 
efficacy information for a complex medical device in a DTCA.  
Some of the defects, such as the lack of availability and 
transparency about surgeons and hospitals, are clearly outside the 
ability of either a medical device manufacturer or the FDA to access 
or control.  This would be true even if referring physicians were 
eminently knowledgeable about medical devices and even if the 
problems in the medical device approval process did not exist.  But, 
if the primary justification for protecting the commercial speech 
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rights of manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical 
devices and other medical products regulated by the FDA is that 
the advertisements and promotions are educational and fully 
informative about relative risks and benefits,55 the protection may 
not be deserved if the advertisements cannot be educational in the 
way in which DTCAs of prescription drugs are. 
At present, the purported educational purpose of DTCA 
cannot be met because of the inherent information defects and 
limitations on information for consumers.  All of this raises another 
interesting question, which is beyond the scope of this article but 
worth considering: Do consumers/patients lose anything by not 
being exposed to DTCA for medical devices?  At present, there is 
no way to know.  But one could argue that the absence of such 
advertising does not adversely impact overall consumer health and 
in fact might actually be of some benefit.  DTCA of prescription 
drugs is illegal in all Western European countries and this does not 
seem to have adversely impacted the health of the patient 
population in those countries at all. 
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH DTCA OF MEDICAL 
DEVICES?  IF SO, WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT AND HOW                               
SHOULD IT BE SOLVED? 
The medical device industry is likely going to continue to 
promote high-tech, profitable, restricted, surgically implantable 
medical devices directly to consumers in billboard and magazine 
advertisements for the foreseeable future via promotion by 
surgeons and hospitals/medical centers.  The interests of the 
manufacturers and subspecialty healthcare providers are aligned 
because the promotion of high technology goes hand in hand with 
marketing and profits. 
The volume of DTCA in television and other broadcast media 
(aside from the Internet) is minimal at the moment.  One 
explanation for the relative paucity of broadcast advertising by 
medical device manufacturers is that they are content to let the 
 
 55.  The Central Hudson test does not predicate its protection of commercial 
speech on the fact that advertisements must be truly educational, Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), though one could 
argue that if advertisements are not educational at all then they are purely to 
generate demand for products.  In fact, the Supreme Court has allowed potentially 
misleading information to survive so long as it is accompanied by a disclaimer.  
The Court does not cite evidence establishing the usefulness of disclaimers. 
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medical profession do most of the advertising for them.  Another 
explanation is that television advertising may be too expensive for 
surgeons and hospitals to aggressively market in, unlike the 
pharmaceutical industry, which has vastly greater financial 
resources and is willing to devote up to twenty percent or more of 
its revenues to marketing activities.  A third alternative is that the 
Internet is cheaper, easier, more widespread, and essentially 
unregulated.  There is no substantive research on Internet-based 
advertising for the complicated restricted surgically implantable 
devices we have discussed here. 
If medical professionals were required to meet FDA statutory 
standards for their advertisements, the information provided by the 
manufacturer in current advertisements would not be in 
compliance.  There is no evidence, however, that this situation has 
created problems with the FDA for medical device manufacturers.  
It is a virtual certainty that these advertisements will never be able 
to meet the statutory requirements for either fair and balanced 
information or contain all of the relevant information that a 
consumer would need in order to make a truly educated decision 
regarding the appropriateness of the device for themselves even if 
the medical device manufacturers decided to do most of the 
advertising themselves.  The reasons for this are not completely 
under the FDA’s or the medical device industry’s control because, 
unlike pharmaceuticals, it is impossible to separate effectiveness 
and safety of a device from the surgeon and affiliate institution due 
to an almost total lack of transparency.  Even if there were 
transparency of medical provider/institution performance and 
safety information, there is still the lack of safety information for 
those devices reaching consumers via 510(k) clearance. 
The deficiencies in information are global in the sense that 
they apply to all restricted medical devices that are implanted by 
surgeons in health care facilities (hospitals or surgical centers) and 
insurmountable in the sense that there is no way to separate the 
effectiveness and safety of the device from either the non-surgical 
alternatives or the competence and safety of the surgeon and the 
facility.  The lack of transparency of information regarding the 
comparative effectiveness of competing medical devices, of devices 
versus non-surgical alternatives, or of meaningful, accurate 
information on the relative abilities and outcomes for surgeons 
simply makes the matter worse. 
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If most of the advertising for these complex devices is done by 
the medical profession, not industry, the burden of responsibility 
for protecting patients and consumers from misleading, false, or 
grossly inadequate advertising is not the FDA’s problem, but rather 
falls on the individual states, and their respective state medical 
boards and attorneys general.  Unlike the situation in advertising 
and promotion for prescription pharmaceuticals, the main 
problem is not the First Amendment and attempts by the FDA to 
protect public health by restriction of manufacturers’ commercial 
speech.  The problem in advertising of restricted, surgically 
implanted medical devices is consumer fraud and the regulation of 
the medical profession at the state level. 
Whether the situation whereby the medical profession does 
virtually all of the advertising and promotion to consumers exists 
because it is easier or cheaper; or because of the structure and 
competition among hospitals; or because of the close ties or 
capture of the medical profession and hospitals by the medical 
devices industry; or because the industry has determined that it can 
make an end-run around the regulations by letting medical 
surrogates do the advertising; or if it is because medical device 
manufacturers have determined that information defects cannot be 
overcome if they do the advertising; or some combination of these 
is unknown.  What is known is that DTCA of complex, restricted, 
surgically implanted medical devices is very different than that for 
prescription drugs.  So different, in fact, that neither the FDA nor 
the First Amendment are where the enforcement battles are likely 
to (or should) be fought. 
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